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THE TRIBAL RIGHT TO EXCLUDE OTHERS FROM INDIANOWNED LANDS
Alex Tallchief Skibine*
In May 2020, two Indian tribes in South Dakota—the Cheyenne River
Sioux and Oglala Sioux Tribes—established health safety checkpoints on
state and federal roads accessing the entrance to their reservations, invoking
the dangers caused by COVID-19. The South Dakota Governor threatened
immediate legal action, arguing that such roadblocks could only happen
pursuant to an agreement with the State.1 Later that summer, the Blackfeet
Nation in northern Montana refused to open its access road to tourists
wanting to visit Glacier National Park.2 Unlike in South Dakota, the
Montana Governor supported the Tribe’s decision.3
In South Dakota, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe argued that the tribal
checkpoints were legal because the Tribe had a “treaty right to exclude”
non-members from its reservation.4 Besides the treaty right to exclude,
tribes can also claim that, as sovereign nations, they should have the
inherent power to control their borders.
This Article does not focus on the COVID-19 issues facing the tribes.
Others have already done this.5 Instead, it casts a wider net and examines,
* S.J Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.
J.D. Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.
1. That lawsuit was never filed. Instead, the Governor asked for the help of the federal
government which eventually threatened to cancel a number of contracts it had with the two
tribes unless they complied with the request to dismantle their roadblocks. One of these
tribes eventually filed a lawsuit asking for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the
federal government to make good on its threat. The facts as stated here are taken from the
tribal complaint which was filed on June 23, 2020. See Complaint for Injunctive &
Declaratory Relief at 3, Sioux Tribe v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-01709 (D.D.C. June 23, 2020),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/2020-06-23-crst-v.-trump-complaint.pdf.
2. See Kathleen McLaughlin, A Closed Border, Pandemic-Weary Tourists and a Big
Bottleneck at Glacier National Park, WASH. POST (Jul. 11, 2020), https://www.washington
post.com/national/a-closed-border-pandemic-weary-tourists-and-a-big-bottleneck-at-glaciernational-park/2020/07/10/607694f2-c2c0-11ea-b4f6-cb39cd8940fb_story.html.
3. Id.
4. Press Release, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, Chairman Harold Frazier Statement on
Governor Kristi Noem Letter Regarding Health Checkpoints on Reservation (May 8, 2020),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/crst-letter-to-gov.-noem.pdf.
5. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Lives Matter: Pandemic and Inherent Tribal
Powers, 73 STAN. L. REV. 38 (2020). Ann E. Tweedy, The Validity of Tribal Checkpoints in
South Dakota to Curb the Spread of Covid-19, 2021 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming).
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from a general perspective, the Tribes’ power to exclude non-members
from their reservations.
Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of the inherent sovereign
power to control the activities of non-members on lands owned by nonmembers within the reservation.6 This principle, announced in the Supreme
Court’s 1981 decision in Montana v. United States, stands unless one of
two exceptions applies.7 This doctrine is now known as the implicit
divestiture doctrine.8 In Montana, the Crow Tribe argued that because the
1868 treaty reserved the land for the exclusive use of the Tribe, “[t]he
treaty, therefore, obligated the United States to prohibit most non-Indians
from residing on or passing through reservation lands used and occupied by
the Tribe, and, thereby, arguably conferred upon the Tribe the authority to
control fishing and hunting on those lands . . . .”9 The Court held, however,
that once Congress allowed non-members to acquire land within the
reservation, any tribal authority over non-Indian hunting and fishing could
“only extend to land on which the Tribe exercises ‘absolute and undisturbed
use and occupation.’”10 In addition, because neither of the two exceptions to
Montana’s general rule were available,11 the Crow Tribe could not control
fishing activities by non-members on the Big Horn River within its
reservation since the bed of the river was now owned by the State.12
For twenty years, Montana’s general rule was not applied to limit tribal
jurisdiction over non-member activities taking place on tribal or Indianowned land.13 However, in 2001, the Supreme Court unanimously extended
6. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–65 (1981).
7. Id. at 565–66. The first one is known as the consensual relations exception and
allows tribal jurisdiction over non-members who have entered into contracts, leases or other
agreements with the tribe or its members. The second one, known as the tribal selfgovernment exception, allows tribal jurisdiction if the activities of non-members poses a
threat to the political integrity, economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. Id.
8. See infra notes 17–27 and accompanying text.
9. 450 U.S. at 558–59.
10. Id. at 559 (quoting Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crows, art. II, May 7, 1868, 15
Stat. 650); see id. (“If the 1868 treaty created tribal power to restrict or prohibit non-Indian
hunting and fishing on the reservation, that power cannot apply to lands held in fee by nonIndians.”).
11. See supra note 7.
12. Montana, 450 U.S. at 550–56 (holding that the ownership of the bed of the Big
Horn River, where the fishing was taking place, was transferred to the State of Montana at
statehood).
13. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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the Montana principle to Indian-owned land in Nevada v. Hicks.14 Now,
twenty years after Hicks was decided, an analysis of the cases shows that
lower courts disagree on when to apply Montana to the assertion of tribal
jurisdiction over non-members on Indian-owned lands.15 Although
unanimous in its holding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction over
a lawsuit involving state law enforcement officials as defendants, the Hicks
Court was divided on the reasoning for the holding.16 In effect, there were
three opinions, consisting of three Justices each,17 that independently
adopted different views of what role the status of the land played in
determining whether the Tribe had jurisdiction.18
Many scholars have addressed the issue of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers comprehensively.19 Notably, Professor Judith Royster, in a
perceptive 2015 article, covered some of the same ground this Article will
be addressing.20 Like Professor Royster, this Article takes the position that
Montana should not apply to lands in which tribes have retained the right to
exclude.21 However, in concluding that “the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hicks is neither intelligible nor doctrinally helpful,”22 Professor Royster did

14. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
15. See infra Part II.
16. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 387 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
17. In addition to the Scalia opinion, Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion joined by
Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 375–86 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor filed
an opinion concurring in part joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens. Id. at 387–401
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
18. There was also a concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself, id. at
386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring), and a concurring opinion by Justice Stevens joined by Justice
Breyer that echoed Justice O’Connor’s opinion, which Stevens and Breyer also had joined,
id. at 401–04 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19. See, e.g., Matthew L. M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction,
46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779 (2014); Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal
Courts' Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499 (2013); Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187
(2010).
20. See Judith V. Royster, Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal
Authority over Nonmembers on Trust Lands, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 889 (2015).
21. Id. at 892 (“Over the years, discussions of the Montana-Hicks line of cases seem to
start and end with the question of inherent tribal authority over nonmembers. . . . The treaty
rights approach has been lost in the discussion and needs to be revived. This Article intends
to bring the treaty rights argument—that Indian tribes have rights to govern on trust lands
recognized by treaty and treaty-equivalents—back to the forefront.”).
22. Id. at 904.
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not try to make sense of Justice Scalia’s heavy reliance on the State’s
interests in law enforcement.23 This Article attempts this task.
This Article argues, first, that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks can be
conceptualized as using the state interest in law enforcement to support the
finding that the Tribe had lost the right to exclude state law enforcement
officials in the case. In effect, Hicks could be read as requiring a two-step
analysis to determine if an Indian tribe has retained jurisdiction over nonmembers on Indian-owned lands. The first step in this analysis asks courts
to determine whether a tribe has retained its right to exclude. If the tribe has
retained this right, this is the end of the inquiry and the tribe has
jurisdiction. If the tribe has not retained this right, step two requires courts
to apply the Montana framework in determining whether one or both of the
exceptions to Montana’s general rule apply to preserve tribal jurisdiction.
In addition, this Article analyzes whether there should be a difference
between a tribal treaty right to exclude non-members from the reservations
and the “inherent sovereign” right to exclude when it comes to deciding
whether such a “right to exclude” has been abrogated. Professor Royster
took the position that there should be no difference, stating that “[n]ot all
Indian tribes have treaties with the federal government. When it comes to
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on Indian lands based on treaty rights,
where does that leave tribes without formal treaties? The answer, I submit,
is in exactly the same place as tribes with treaties.”24 This Article takes the
position that this may not necessarily be the case.
To explore these issues, Part I of this Article explains the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding tribal control over non-members. Part II analyzes
the ongoing debate among the federal circuit courts of appeals concerning
the interpretation of Hicks and concludes that the approach adopted by the
Ninth Circuit is the more sound one. Finally, after exploring the differences,
if any, between the tribes’ sovereign right to exclude and their treaty right
to exclude, Part III looks at the right to exclude beyond tribal jurisdiction
over non-members; namely, this Article considers the role the right to
exclude plays when it comes to determining whether federal laws of general
applicability should apply to Indian tribes.

23. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (“The State's interest in execution of
process is considerable, and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the
tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state government.”).
24. Royster, supra note 20, at 919.
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I. The Implicit Divestiture Doctrine and the Right to Exclude
from Montana to Hicks and Beyond
A. Montana v. United States: The “Pathmarking” Case25
The main issue in Montana was whether the Tribe had the authority to
regulate hunting and fishing by non-members.26 These non-members were
hunting and fishing on land determined by the Court to be non-Indian fee
land located within the Crow Indian reservation.27 The Tribe first argued
that its 1868 treaty with the United States granted such authority; article II
of the treaty not only established a reservation for the Crow Tribe but also
provided that it be “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation of the Indians herein named.”28
The Court recognized that the “treaty . . . obligated the United States to
prohibit most non-Indians from residing on or passing through reservation
lands used and occupied by the Tribe, and, thereby, arguably conferred
upon the Tribe the authority to control fishing and hunting on those
lands.”29 Nonetheless, the Court held that this authority “could only extend
to land on which the Tribe exercises ‘absolute and undisturbed use and
occupation.’”30 Since the land in question was owned by the State, the Tribe
could no longer exercise undisturbed use and occupation.31
Having disposed of the treaty argument, the Montana Court addressed
whether the Tribe could nevertheless control non-members under its
inherent sovereign power.32 Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart
announced what, at the time, seemed to be a new principle: “[E]xercise of
tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes . . . .”33 Subsequently, Justice Stewart held that, as a general
proposition, “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend
to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”34

25. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Montana was first referred to as “pathmarking” in Strate v. A1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
26. 450 U.S. at 547.
27. Id. at 556–57.
28. Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crows, supra note 10, art. 2 (emphasis added).
29. Montana, 450 U.S. at 558–59.
30. Id. at 559.
31. Id. at 558–59.
32. Id. at 563–64.
33. Id. at 564.
34. Id. at 565.
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The Court identified two exceptions to its general rule.35 The first
exception, now known as the “consensual relations” exception, allows
tribes to “regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements.”36 The second exception, known as the “tribal selfgovernment” exception, allows tribal civil authority over the conduct of
non-members (even on fee lands within the reservation) “when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”37 Unfortunately for the Crow
Tribe, however, neither of these exceptions applied to this case.38
B. Strate v. A-1- Contractors: Equating Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
with Tribal Regulatory Power
In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Supreme Court considered the tribal
court’s jurisdiction over a lawsuit filed by one non-member against another
non-member.39 The dispute in this case resulted from a fender-bender
accident that happened within the reservation but on a road over which the
State maintained a right of way.40 The Court held that the tribal court did
not have jurisdiction over the case.41
The Strate opinion brought about three important clarifications, or,
perhaps, modifications, to the Montana analysis. First, it clarified that, in
order to be considered “Indian owned” land for the purposes of the
Montana analysis, a tribe must have retained a “gatekeeper” role in
excluding non-members from the area.42 Second, and more importantly, it
held that the Montana analysis was applicable to both tribal regulatory and
adjudicatory jurisdiction because, “[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe's
35. Id. at 565–66.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 566.
38. Id. (“No such circumstances, however, are involved in this case. Non-Indian hunters
and fishermen on non-Indian fee land do not enter any agreements or dealings with the Crow
Tribe so as to subject themselves to tribal civil jurisdiction. And nothing in this case suggests
that such non-Indian hunting and fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic
security as to justify tribal regulation.”).
39. 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
40. Id. at 442–43.
41. Id. at 442.
42. Id. at 455–56. Since the tribe had not maintained that role here, the Court ruled that
the state right of way was the equivalent of non-member fee land for the purposes of the
Montana analysis. Id. at 456.
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adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”43 In
effect, to determine whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant, courts must only ask whether the tribal council could
have regulated the non-member activity on the land in question.44 In its
third clarification to Montana, the Court considerably narrowed the scope
of the tribal self-government exception to Montana’s general rule. Here, it
held that having jurisdiction over non-members driving on state roads
within reservations was not necessary to the health and welfare of the
tribes.45
Determining where, for the purposes of the Montana analysis, the
crucial facts took place can be a complicated question.46 For instance, in
Wilson v. Horton’s Towing, a tribal police officer suspected that Wilson, a
non-Indian, was driving while inebriated.47 The officer stopped Wilson on a
state road within the reservation.48 After finding drugs in the vehicle, the
tribal officer called a state trooper, who arrested the non-Indian driver for a
DWI and impounded the driver’s truck off the reservation.49 The next day,
the Lummi Tribal Court issued a “Notice of Seizure and Intent to Institute
Forfeiture”; under the Lummi Nation’s tribal code, possession of marijuana
over one ounce is grounds for civil forfeiture.50 Eventually, Horton’s
Towing released the truck to the Tribe.51 Wilson, the driver, brought suit in
federal court against Horton’s Towing and the arresting tribal officer.52
Finding a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held
that the non-Indian driver had to exhaust his tribal remedies before bringing
his suit in federal court.53 The court stated, “In this case, the threshold
question is whether Plaintiff's claim ‘bears some direct connection to tribal
43. Id. at 453.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 459 (“Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway
accident at issue is needed to preserve ‘the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.’”) (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
46. See discussion infra note 94–98, 108–11.
47. 906 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 2018).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.; LUMMI TRIBAL CODE § 5.09A.110(d)(2) (2016), https://narf.org/nill/codes/
lummi/5Offenses.pdf.
51. Wilson, 906 F.3d at 777.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 778. The requirement that a party should first exhaust the available tribal
remedies before filing in federal court arguing that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction
was first promulgated in National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S.
845, 856–57 (1985), and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15–16 (1987).
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lands,’ such that tribal jurisdiction is colorable.”54 Because the driver was
found with several containers of marijuana in his truck immediately after
leaving the tribal casino,55 the court found that, although the driver was
stopped on a state road, “one could logically conclude that the forfeiture
was a response to his unlawful possession of marijuana while on tribal land.
So interpreted, the events giving rise to the conversion claim reveal a
‘direct connection to tribal lands.’”56
C. Nevada v. Hicks: The Origin of the Confusion
Nevada v. Hicks involved a lawsuit filed in tribal court by a member of
the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes of western Nevada against Nevada and
its state officials.57 Hicks alleged that state game wardens violated his civil
rights and damaged his property when they entered the reservation to search
his house for evidence related to his alleged off-reservation crime of
hunting out-of-season.58 The state's game wardens acted pursuant to
warrants issued by both the state and tribal court.59 Once the case reached
the Supreme Court, the main issue was whether the tribal court had
jurisdiction over the non-member defendants.60 The Tribes argued that the
Montana analysis was not applicable since the non-member state law
enforcement officials’ activities relevant to the lawsuit took place on
Indian-owned land.61
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for the Court, holding that the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction.62 Justice Souter concurred and was joined by
Justices Kennedy and Thomas.63 Therein, Souter stated:

54. Wilson, 906 F.3d at 779 (quoting Smith v. Salish Kootenai C., 434 F.3d 1127, 1135
(9th Cir. 2006)).
55. Id. at 780.
56. Id.; see also Employer’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Branch, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1152
(2019). The Branch court found that none of the contracts made by a non-reservation
insurance company with a non-Indian contractor, whose employees negligently caused a
massive fuel leak on the reservation, were made on the reservation. Id. Therefore, the
insurance company was not subject to the jurisdiction of the tribal court. Id.
57. 533 U.S. 353, 355–57 (2001).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 356.
60. Id. at 357.
61. Id. at 359 (“Respondents and the United States argue that since Hicks's home and
yard are on tribe-owned land within the reservation, the Tribe may make its exercise of
regulatory authority over nonmembers a condition of nonmembers' entry.”).
62. Id. at 364–65.
63. Id. at 375 (Souter, J., concurring).
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While I agree with the Court's analysis as well as its conclusion,
I would reach that point by a different route . . . . [W]hile the
Court gives emphasis to measuring tribal authority here in light
of the State's interest in executing its own legal process to
enforce state law governing off-reservation conduct, I would go
right to Montana's rule . . . .64
Joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens, Justice O’Connor also concurred
because she believed the court of appeals erred in not considering the state
officials’ claim of sovereign immunity.65 Nonetheless, she would have
remanded to the lower courts on the issue of whether the tribe had
jurisdiction under the Montana exceptions.66
The question here is why Justice Scalia did not go directly to the
Montana rule as Justice Souter did. There are three possible interpretations
of Justice Scalia’s opinion.
The first interpretation, followed in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits,67 is
that Scalia was, in fact, just performing a Montana analysis. Under that
interpretation, Hicks stands for the proposition that Montana‘s general rule
of no-tribal jurisdiction over non-members extends to all lands within
Indian reservations. To be sure, language used by Justice Scalia towards the
end of the opinion suggested as much :
[T]ribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process
related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not
essential to tribal self-government or internal relations—to “the
right to make laws and be ruled by them.” The State’s interest in
execution of process is considerable, and even when it relates to
Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe’s self-government
than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state
government.68

64. Id.
65. Id. at 401 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would therefore reverse the Court of
Appeals in this case on the ground that it erred in failing to address the state officials'
immunity defenses.”).
66. Id. at 396 (“If the Court were to remain true to the principles that have governed in
prior cases, the Court would reverse and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a
proper application of Montana to determine whether there is tribal jurisdiction.”).
67. See discussion infra notes 93–111.
68. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364.
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A second interpretation of the Scalia opinion, followed in the latest
Tenth Circuit case on that issue,69 is that the Hicks holding is limited to
denying tribal jurisdiction over state law enforcement officials conducting
criminal investigations on the reservation. Justice Ginsburg adopted this
position in her short concurring opinion.70 Also supporting this
interpretation is the majority’s statement in a footnote that “[o]ur holding in
this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state
officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.”71 Under this second
interpretation, the Court does consider the state’s interests in law
enforcement, but it does so in a Montana-type analysis to determine
whether they outweigh the tribal interest in self-government as described in
the second Montana exception. Under that exception, a tribe has
jurisdiction over the conduct of non-members when such conduct threatens
the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the
tribe.72
A third possible understanding of the opinion, followed by the Ninth
Circuit,73 is that Justice Scalia first determined that the tribe had, in fact,
lost the right to exclude state agents from the reservation in cases involving
important state interests such as were present in Hicks. Thus, instead of first
evaluating whether any of the Montana exceptions apply, courts should first
debate the importance of the State’s interests to determine whether the tribe
has lost the right to exclude these state law-enforcement officials from
Indian-owned lands. In other words, the balancing of the tribal and state
interests at stake determines if the tribe has lost the right to exclude. It is
only after the court has determined that the tribe had lost the right to
exclude that the Montana analysis becomes applicable.
Thus, after stating that the Supreme Court’s “cases make clear that the
Indians' right to make their own laws and be governed by them does not
exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation,”74 Justice Scalia
focused on the right of states to run “process” inside the reservations which

69. See Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe, 862 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2017); see also discussion
infra notes 124–36.
70. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring.)
71. Id. at 358 n.2.
72. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
73. See discussion infra notes 137–83.
74. Hicks, 553 U.S. at 361.
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he claimed had been recognized since the 1880s.75 Justice Scalia added that
“[w]hile it is not entirely clear from our precedent whether the last
mentioned authority entails the corollary right to enter a reservation
(including Indian-fee lands) for enforcement purposes, several of our
opinions point in that direction.”76
Scalia also invoked Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Reservation77 for the proposition that states can have jurisdiction even over
Indian tribes and their members on Indian reservations.78 True enough, the
Court has, in the past, stated that “under certain circumstances a State may
validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation,
and . . . in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the
on-reservation activities of tribal members.”79 Following this reasoning, it
was expected that Justice Scalia would next argue that the State had the
power to enter the reservation and assume jurisdiction over Hicks because
of exceptional circumstances, thereby abrogating the Tribe’s right to
exclude. He did not, however, explicitly put it in these terms. Instead he
rather abruptly asserted, “We conclude today, in accordance with these
prior statements, that tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing
process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential
to tribal self-government or internal relations—to ‘the right to make laws
and be ruled by them.’”80
75. Id. at 363–64 (“The Court's references to ‘process’ in Utah & Northern R.
Co. and Kagama, and the Court's concern in Kagama over possible federal encroachment on
state prerogatives, suggest state authority to issue search warrants in cases such as the one
before us.”); see also Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) (defining “process”
as “any means used by court to acquire or exercise its jurisdiction over a person or over
specific property”).
76. Hicks, 553 U.S. at 363.
77. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
78. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362 (“When, however, state interests outside the reservation
are implicated, States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on tribal land, as
exemplified by our decision in Confederated Tribes. In that case, Indians were selling
cigarettes on their reservation to nonmembers from off reservation, without collecting the
state cigarette tax. We held that the State could require the Tribes to collect the tax from
nonmembers, and could ‘impose at least “minimal” burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in
enforcing and collecting the tax’ . . . .”) (quoting Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 151).
79. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987) (citing
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1983)).
80. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364. The Court also added, “The State's interest in execution of
process is considerable, and even when it relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the
tribe's self-government than federal enforcement of federal law impairs state government.”
Id.
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D. Post-Hicks Supreme Court Cases
Although the Supreme Court had the opportunity to comment on Hicks
twice since 2001, neither of those cases added much to the debate. In Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., the Court
contemplated a tribal court’s jurisdiction over a discrimination lawsuit.81
This suit was brought by tribal members against a non-Indian bank,
claiming the bank discriminated against them in the sale of a parcel of nonIndian fee land within the reservation.82 The Supreme Court held that the
tribal court had no jurisdiction over the non-member defendant because the
Tribe had lost the right to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land on the
reservation.83 Allowing the Tribe to invoke its tort law in this case would
allow the tribal court to control the sale of such non-Indian fee land.84
The Court hardly mentioned Hicks in its Opinion.85 However, it did state
that Montana’s “general rule restricts tribal authority over nonmember
activities taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the
nonmember's activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by nonIndians . . . .”86 Thus, at the very least, the Court implied that Montana was
applicable to activities on both Indian and non-Indian land within the
reservations.
Of course, it is essential to understand that the debate is not whether the
Montana analysis is applicable to all reservation lands. It clearly can be.
The debate regards when should the analysis take place: either directly, as
Justice Souter did in Hicks, or after the Court weighs the state interest, as
Justice Scalia arguably did.
The other post-Hicks case, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians, ended in a 4-4 draw without a decision.87 The Court’s
action meant that the decision below, Dolgencorp, Inc., v. Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians, which upheld tribal jurisdiction over a non-Indian
corporation, was left undisturbed.88 The Fifth Circuit, in Dolgencorp,
81. 554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 332, 341.
84. Id. at 331–32.
85. Id. at 334–35. The Court, however, did quote from Hicks for the purposes of stating,
“Tribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to that right of
the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them.” Id. at 335 (citing Hicks, 533
U.S. at 361).
86. Id. at 328.
87. 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
88. See 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014).
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upheld the jurisdiction of the tribal court over a lawsuit by the Tribe against
a non-Indian corporation whose employee allegedly sexually abused a
minor tribal member who was working for the corporation on tribal land.89
The circuit court upheld tribal jurisdiction under Montana’s commercial
relationship exception.90 The court never mentioned, let alone discussed,
Nevada v. Hicks, even though the alleged wrongdoing occurred on land the
Tribe had leased to the corporation.91
Needless to say, the three Hicks plurality opinions, and the perplexing
structure of Scalia’s main opinion, generated some confusion among the
lower courts for the last twenty years. The Supreme Court has never
revisited the issue because Plains Commerce Bank, the only opinion issued
since Hicks in the area of tribal jurisdiction over non-members, involved
non-Indian fee land.92 The next Part of this Article discusses the various
positions adopted by the circuit courts.
II. The Federal Circuits’ Debate on When to Extend Montana
to Indian-Owned Lands Within Reservations
A. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ Approach: Interpreting Hicks As
Always Extending Montana to All Reservation Lands Owned by the Tribes
or Their Members
A number of Seventh and Eighth Circuit cases followed Justice Souter’s
Hicks concurrence and extended Montana directly to all lands within the
reservations, Indian and non-Indian owned. In Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Lac
du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians,93 the Seventh
Circuit specifically disagreed with the proposition that Hicks was of limited
applicability when it came to tribal jurisdiction over Indian owned lands.94
This case involved a lawsuit filed by a tribal entity in tribal court seeking to
invalidate a sale of tribal bonds made with a non-Indian bank.95 Although
the tribal entity pointed to “multiple meetings, during which Stifel allegedly
89. Id. at 169–70.
90. Id. at 173–74.
91. It seems that the district court in the case had adopted a broad interpretation of Hicks
and the Tribe decided to focus its appeal on the applicability of the Montana exceptions. See
Dolgencorp Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 846 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (S.D. Miss.
2011).
92. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 320
(2008).
93. 807 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 2015).
94. Id. at 206–07.
95. Id. at 189–90.
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“misrepresented material terms of the Bond Transaction,”96 the Seventh
Circuit noted that the District Court had found that there was “no evidence
presented that any negotiations with respect to the Bond Transaction or
Documents took place on tribal land.”97
Although the Seventh Circuit never concluded that no non-member
activities took place on tribal lands, that fact ended up not being essential to
its analysis of tribal jurisdiction. For instance, answering the tribal
argument that Montana only applies to situations in which tribes attempt to
regulate nonmember conduct on non-Indian fee land, as opposed to tribal
trust land, the court stated it “do[es] not believe that these conclusions can
be reconciled with the language that the Court employed in Hicks . . . .”98
The court first focused on language in Hicks, stating that “[t]he ownership
status of land . . . is only one factor to consider in determining whether
regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations.’”99 The court then analyzed
Plains Commerce Bank and concluded that the statement that Montana's
“general rule restricts tribal authority over nonmember activities taking
place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember's
activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians”100 left no doubt
that “Montana applies regardless of whether the actions take place on fee or
non-fee land.”101
The Eight Circuit also adopted a broad definition of Hicks. In Attorney’s
Process & Investigation Services, Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, the non-Indian
defendant sent a group of armed men to take over the tribal casino on behalf
of a competing tribal political faction.102 The Sac and Fox Tribe sued the
non-Indian security firm in tribal court for trespass and other intentional
torts as well as damages to tribal property incurred during the take-over.103
The non-Indian defendant brought a lawsuit in federal court asking for a
declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over this case.
Although the Eight Circuit relied on the second Montana exception (threat
96. Id. at 207.
97. Id. at 193.
98. Id. at 207 n.60.
99. Id. at 206 (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001)).
100. Id. at 207 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 544
U.S. 316, 328 (2008)).
101. Id. at 208. The Seventh Circuit went on to uphold the District Court’s decision that
there was no likelihood that the tribal court had jurisdiction over the non-member parties. Id.
at 208–09.
102. 609 F.3d 927, 931–32 (8th Cir. 2010).
103. Id. at 933.
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to tribal health and welfare, political integrity, and economic security) to
uphold the jurisdiction of the tribal court,104 it also stated
Although the issue in the Montana case was about tribal
regulatory authority over nonmember fee land within the
reservation, Montana's analytic framework now sets the outer
limits of tribal civil jurisdiction—both regulatory and
adjudicatory—over nonmember activities on tribal and
nonmember land. . . . The Court has also indicated that
“Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”105
Toward the end of its opinion, the court mentioned that the Tribe had a
right to exclude non-members from Tribe-owned land, but it only invoked
that right as part of the Montana framework.106
More recently, in Belcourt Public School District v. Davis, the Eighth
Circuit applied Montana to deny tribal jurisdiction over a school district on
what may have been Indian-owned land.107 This case involved multiple
employment-related claims by tribal employees against the school
district.108 Although the status of the land as Indian- or non-Indian-owned
was not clear, the court disposed of this issue, stating
[T]here is scant evidence in the record what, if any, land and
facilities relevant to this case were owned by the Tribe.
Nevertheless, even if the Tribe owned all of the land and
facilities relevant to this case—which is not supported by the

104. Id. at 940 (“[B]ecause API's forceful intervention on October 1, 2003 threatened the
‘political integrity, the economic security, [and] the health [and] welfare’ of the Tribe, as
well as its rights as a landowner, the tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over the claims
that arise out of that conduct.”) (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566
(1981)) (second and third alterations in original).
105. Id. at 936 (citing Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360).
106. Id. at 940 (“Finally, there remains ‘the critical importance of land status’ to
questions of tribal jurisdiction under Montana. Here, the Tribe does not seek to assert
jurisdiction over non Indian fee land. The facilities API raided are on tribal trust land. The
Tribe's trespass and trade secret claims thus seek to regulate API's entry and conduct upon
tribal land, and they accordingly ‘stem from the tribe's “landowner's right to occupy and
exclude.”’ A ‘tribe's “traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons” from tribal
land . . . gives it the power to set conditions on entry to that land.’”) (internal citations
omitted).
107. 786 F.3d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 2015).
108. Id. at 656.
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record—Montana would still apply, and our analysis would not
change . . . .109
The court never mentioned the tribal right to exclude and held that the two
Montana exceptions (consensual relations and tribal self-government) did
not provide the tribal court with jurisdiction in this case.110
The first part of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hicks tends to support
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits’ position. Thus, after stating that
“[b]oth Montana and Strate rejected
tribal
authority
to
regulate
nonmembers' activities on land over which the tribe could not ‘assert a
landowner's right to occupy and exclude,’”111 and remarking that the land
status was central to the analysis of the Court in previous cases, the Court
concluded that “the reason that was so was not that Indian ownership
suspends the ‘general proposition’ . . . that ‘the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe.’”112 Justice Scalia also noted that the Montana Court implied that its
general rule was applicable throughout the reservation when it stated that
Indian tribes retain “some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians . . .
even on non-Indian fee lands.”113 Finally, after remarking that who owns
the land is only one factor to consider in determining whether tribal
regulation of non-members is necessary to protect tribal self-government,
Justice Scalia stated “the existence of tribal ownership is not alone enough
to support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers.”114
These statements imply that the Court did engage in a “Montana
analysis.” For instance, later in the Opinion, when Justice Scalia criticized
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence for asserting that the Court’s “reasoning
‘gives only passing consideration to the fact that the state officials’
109. Id. at 660 n.5 (internal citation omitted). For an almost identical Eighth Circuit case,
see Fort Yates Public School District No. 4 v. Murphy, 786 F.3d 662, 670 n.6 (8th Cir. 2015)
(“[T]his court is aware that ‘[t]he ownership status of land’ is ‘one factor to consider in
determining whether regulation of the activities of nonmembers is “necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”’ As noted above, however, there is
scant evidence in the record what land and facilities relevant to this case were owned by the
Tribe. Nevertheless, even if the Tribe owned all of the land and facilities relevant to this
case—which is not supported by the record—Montana would still apply, and our analysis
would not change for the reasons stated herein.”) (internal citation omitted).
110. Davis, 786 F.3d at 660–61.
111. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456
(1997)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 360 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
114. Id.
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activities in this case occurred on land owned and controlled by the
Tribes.’”115 He responded:
To the contrary, we acknowledge that tribal ownership is a factor
in the Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it
“may sometimes be . . . dispositive.” We simply do not find it
dispositive in the present case, when weighed against the State's
interest in pursuing off-reservation violations of its laws.116
But why did Justice Scalia mention Nevada’s interest in law enforcement
before concluding that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction in the case?
The State’s interests were never part of any Montana analysis under which
courts should evaluate whether jurisdiction of non-members is necessary to
tribal self-government. For this reason, I believe there are two other
interpretations of the Court’s Hicks opinion that make more sense of
Scalia’s invocation of the state interests.
B. The Tenth Circuit Approach: From a Broad Interpretation of Hicks to
One Limiting It to Cases Involving Strong State Law Enforcement Interests
In 2007, the Tenth Circuit decided MacArthur v. San Juan County.117
This case involved tribal members, employed by a health clinic, who were
challenging certain administrative actions taken by the clinic.118 Whether
the alleged wrongful conduct of the non-members occurred on what can be
classified as Indian or non-Indian fee land was debatable because although
the clinic started out as part of a County Health Services district, the County
relinquished operation of the Clinic on January 1, 2000.119 At this time, the
Utah Navajo Health Systems, an entity affiliated with the Navajo Tribe,
took over operations.120 Although the Tenth Circuit took the position that
“[t]he record indicates that the land on which the Clinic is located is fee
land owned by the State of Utah as part of the Navajo Trust Fund,”121 the
court did address Hicks’ extension to Indian-owned land:
The notion that Montana's applicability turns, in part, on whether
the regulated activity took place on non-Indian land was finally
put to rest in Hicks. . . . Because the activities occurred on Indian
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 370.
Id.
497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

278

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

land, Hicks argued that Montana had no relevance. In rejecting
that argument, the Court explained that . . . language
from Montana itself clearly implied that the general rule
announced in that case applies to Indian and non-Indian land
alike.122
In a more recent decision, however, the Tenth Circuit in Norton v. Ute
Indian Tribe took a much narrower view of Hicks.123 In Norton, the Ute
Tribe sued state police officers who trespassed onto tribal land while
chasing a car occupied by a pair of tribal members.124 In the ensuing
pursuit, Murray—a passenger in the fleeing car—died from a gunshot
wound to the head.125 The parties disagreed as to whether Murray
committed suicide, as the state police claimed, or whether he was shot by
the police.126
In its analysis of this case, the court first addressed the right to
exclude.127 “In light of these repeated confirmations of tribes' right to
exclude nonmembers from tribal lands, we think it plausible that the Tribal
Court possesses jurisdiction over the trespass claim.”128 The court then
addressed the argument that Hicks changed the legal landscape.129 After
noting that the Hicks Court had “expressly limited its holding to ‘the
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state
law,’”130 the Tenth Circuit stated that “the question before us is whether this
case sufficiently mirrors Hicks so as to compel its narrow holding to
apply.”131
The Norton court observed that “[t]he facts in this case differ from those
in Hicks in a critical way” since the tribal member who died from the gun
shot was not suspected of having committed any off-reservation crime.132
“Although the driver of the car was speeding outside of the Reservation,
Murray (the tribal member who died) was merely a passenger.”133 Thus, the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 1069–70.
862 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1241–42.
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Id. at 1244–45.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1248–49.
Id. at 1248 (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001)).
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss2/2

No. 2]

TRIBAL RIGHT TO EXCLUDE FROM INDIAN LANDS

279

court concluded by stating that “[t]o the extent that Murray’s running away
from State Trooper Swenson could be considered an offense, see Utah Code
§ 41-6a-209 (disobeying a lawful order of a law enforcement officer), this
crime does not fit within Hicks' confines.”134 In effect, the Tenth Circuit in
Norton took the position that, in order for Hicks to be controlling, a state
must put forth a substantial law enforcement interest.135
C. The Ninth Circuit Approach: From a Narrow Interpretation of Hicks to
Rejecting the Application of Montana When Tribes Have Preserved the
Right to Exclude
The third category of cases comes from the Ninth Circuit. The first Ninth
Circuit case to discuss the meaning of Hicks was McDonald v. Means.136
This case involved an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction over a tort
resulting from a collision on a federal Bureau of Indian Affairs’(BIA)
road.137 The non-member defendant argued that Hicks extended Montana to
all lands within the reservation.138 After noting that the Hicks Court limited
its holding to the question of tribal court jurisdiction over state officers
enforcing state law, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the limited nature
of Hicks's holding was inapplicable to this case.139 Among the
distinguishing factors was the fact that the Tribe here continued to exercise
control over the road where the incident took place.140
Perhaps the first Ninth Circuit decision to discuss the role of the right to
exclude in a Montana analysis was Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal
Court.141 The issue in Elliot was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to

134. Id.
135. Id. at 1249 (“Given that the chief concern driving the Court in Hicks was the state’s
paramount interest in investigating off-reservation crimes, we cannot say that a similar state
interest is implicated when state officers pursue a tribal member on tribal land for an onreservation offense over which they lack authority.”).
136. 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002).
137. Id. at 535–36.
138. See id. at 540.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 566 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2009). An earlier case, Smith v. Salish Kootenai College,
discussed Hicks but, instead of discussing whether the tribe had kept its right to exclude, it
focused on how the claims were related to tribal land, stating,
The interaction of these factors—the status of the parties and the connection
between the cause of action and Indian lands—is complex . . . . Our own cases,
however, suggest that whether tribal courts may exercise jurisdiction over a
nonmember defendant may turn on how the claims are related to tribal lands.
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hear a case brought by the Tribe against a non-member.142 This nonmember set a signal fire after she got lost on the reservation.143 The fire
ended up burning 400,000 acres of tribal timber.144 After acknowledging
that determining the scope of tribal court jurisdiction was not an easy task,
the court only needed to determine whether tribal jurisdiction was plausible;
the issue, here, was whether the non-member had to first exhaust her tribal
remedies before filing her case in federal court.145 In deciding that tribal
jurisdiction was plausible, the Ninth Circuit examined Supreme Court
precedent and noted:
The Supreme Court has strongly suggested that a tribe may
regulate nonmembers' conduct on tribal lands to the extent that
the tribe can “assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude.”
The tribal regulations at issue stem from the tribe's “landowner's
right to occupy and exclude.” . . . Accordingly, the tribe's
ownership of the land may be dispositive here.146
The court further rejected the argument that Hicks precluded tribal
jurisdiction.147 Although the Hicks Court held that the tribal court lacked
jurisdiction notwithstanding tribal ownership of the land, the Ninth Circuit
stated that “the crux of the Court's reasoning was that the state's strong
interest in executing its criminal warrants concerning an off-reservation
crime outweighed the tribe's interest in regulating the activities of ‘state
wardens.’”148
The Ninth Circuit adopted a somewhat different approach in 2011 in
what would become its leading case: Water Wheel Camp Recreational
434 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006). A later Ninth Circuit opinion, Window Rock Unified
School District v. Reeves, acknowledged that
although Smith v. Salish Kootenai College could arguably be read to extend
the Montana framework [to Indian owned land], the jurisdictional question
in Smith arose in a different context from the one presented here. In Smith, a
nonmember challenged a tribal court’s authority to adjudicate a claim that he
had filed as a plaintiff in tribal court. We held that by filing the claim, the
nonmember had consented to tribal jurisdiction.
861 F.3d 894, 914 n.9 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
142. 566 F.3d at 844–45.
143. Id. at 844.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 849. See supra note 53–56 (discussing exhaustion of tribal court remedies).
146. Elliot, 566 F.3d at 849–50 (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001)).
147. Id. at 850.
148. Id. (citing Hicks, 533 U.S. at 370).
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Area, Inc. v. LaRance.149 This case arose out of a dispute involving a lease
between the Colorado Indian Tribe and its lessee, Water Wheel, which
operated a recreational resort on leased tribal lands.150 After the lease
expired and Water Wheel refused to vacate the premises, the Tribe sued
Water Wheel and its owner in tribal court.151 Water Wheel challenged the
jurisdiction of the tribal court in federal court.152 Although the Ninth Circuit
first stated that Hicks was limited to cases involving strong state law
enforcement interests,153 the court upheld tribal court jurisdiction over the
non-Indian lessee based on a slightly different rationale, stating:
In this instance, where the non-Indian activity in question
occurred on tribal land, the activity interfered directly with the
tribe's inherent powers to exclude and manage its own lands, and
there are no competing state interests at play, the tribe's status as
landowner is enough to support regulatory jurisdiction without
considering Montana.154
The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue two years later in Grand Canyon
Skywalk Development, LLC v. ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa Inc.155 In that case, a nonIndian corporation, Grand Canyon Skywalk, brought a lawsuit in federal
court against a tribally chartered corporation of the Hualapai Indian
Tribe.156 The plaintiff corporation sought a declaratory judgment that the
Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn Grand Canyon Skywalk’s
property rights in a revenue-sharing contract with a tribally chartered
corporation.157 The Ninth Circuit held that the non-Indian corporation had
to exhaust its tribal remedies before bringing an action in federal court
because the tribal court did not plainly lack jurisdiction over that
corporation so as to avoid the tribal exhaustion mandate.158
149. 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011).
150. Id. at 805.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 807.
153. Id. at 813 (“To summarize, Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, as well as
the principle that only Congress may limit a tribe's sovereign authority, suggest that Hicks is
best understood as the narrow decision it explicitly claims to be. Its application
of Montana to a jurisdictional question arising on tribal land should apply only when the
specific concerns at issue in that case exist.”).
154. Id. at 814.
155. 715 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2013).
156. Id. at 1199.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1204–06. The Grand Canyon Skywalk court further stated,
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In extending Water Wheel to the present case, the Grand Canyon
Skywalk court stated that “[a]lthough this case involves an intangible
property right within a contract, rather than a leasehold as
in Water Wheel, the contract in this case equally interfered with the
Hualapai's ability to exclude GCSD from the reservation.”159 Summarizing
its interpretation of Hicks, the Ninth Circuit stated: “When deciding
whether a tribal court has jurisdiction, land ownership may sometimes
prove dispositive, but when a competing state interest exists, courts balance
that interest against the tribe's.”160
Extending Hicks to the activities of non-members on tribal land was also
examined in Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves.161 There,
employees of two school districts filed complaints with the Navajo Tribal
Labor Commission and argued both that the districts owed them merit pay
and that the districts violated the Navajo Preference in Employment Act.162
Before the Commission held evidentiary hearings, the school districts filed
a lawsuit in federal court, arguing that the Commission and the Navajo
tribal courts had no jurisdiction over the school districts’ employment
decisions.163 As in Grand Canyon Skywalk, the issue before the Ninth
Circuit was whether the school district should exhaust its tribal remedies
before filing in federal court.164
The Ninth Circuit first remarked that caselaw recognizes two distinct
frameworks for deciding tribal jurisdiction over non-members on Indian
owned lands: “(1) the right to exclude which generally applies to
nonmember conducts on tribal land; and (2) the exceptions articulated in
Montana v. United States, which generally apply to nonmember conduct on
non-tribal land.”165 Answering arguments that Hicks eliminated the right-toexclude framework, the court stated:
We have interpreted National Farmers as determining that tribal court
exhaustion is not a jurisdictional bar, but rather a prerequisite to a federal
court's exercise of its jurisdiction. “Therefore, under National Farmers, the
federal courts should not even make a ruling on tribal court jurisdiction . . .
until tribal remedies are exhausted.”
Id. at 1200 (quoting Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,
837 F.2d. 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1989)).
159. Id. at 1204.
160. Id. at 1205.
161. 861 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2017).
162. Id. at 896.
163. Id. at 896–97.
164. Id. at 897–98.
165. Id. at 898.
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[T]oday we reaffirm that the right-to-exclude framework
continues to exist. Our court has read Hicks as creating only a
narrow exception to the general rule that, absent contrary
provisions in treaties or federal statutes, tribes retain adjudicative
authority over nonmember conduct on tribal land—land over
which the tribe has the right to exclude. We have held
that Hicks applies “only when the specific concerns at issue in
that case exist.”166
One of the issues in Window Rock Unified School District was whether
Arizona’s interests in regulating education were sufficiently important to
meet the Hicks threshold. The court first rejected the position adopted by
the district court, that “any state interest in this case plainly defeats [tribal]
jurisdiction under Hicks.”167 However, it acknowledged that state interests
beyond those affecting criminal law enforcement could at times trigger
application of Hicks.168 The Ninth Circuit concluded that “because our
caselaw leaves open the question of what state interests might be sufficient
to preclude tribal jurisdiction over disputes arising on tribal land, tribal
jurisdiction is plausible enough here that exhaustion is required.”169
Judge Christen delivered a strong dissent.170 Although the dissent argued
against a narrow interpretation of Hicks,171 the more interesting part of the
dissenting opinion was its argument that, even if the majority was correct in
adopting a narrow interpretation of Hicks, the Tribe still did not have
jurisdiction.172 First, the Tribe had ceded its right to exclude the school
district from the reservation.173 Secondly, even if Hicks is interpreted as
requiring a strong state interest before the Montana framework can be
invoked, Arizona did have a substantial interest relating to education.174
166. Id. (quoting Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802,
813 (9th Cir. 2011)).
167. Id. at 899.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 911–12 (Christen, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 921–22 (concluding, unlike the majority, that exhaustion of tribal remedies
was not required).
173. Id. at 914–16.
174. Id. at 916–18.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court’s amicus brief asserts interests in protecting
Navajo employees and students, and the tribal court’s opening brief asserts
interests in hearing complaints arising from employment decisions of allNavajo school boards. But the school boards are political subdivisions of the
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The Reeves dissent considered the state interest, but not as part of its
right to exclude analysis or the Montana analysis.175 Instead, it analyzed the
state interest in distinguishing previous cases, such as Water Wheel.176
Either the state interest can be discussed as opening the door for a Montana
analysis or it can be conceived as having eliminated the right to exclude. It
is normatively more consistent to discuss the state interests in order to
determine whether a tribe has lost the right to exclude.
The most recent Ninth Circuit decision in this area of the law is Knighton
v. Cedarville Rancheria.177 This case involved a lawsuit filed in tribal court
by the Tribe against a former non-member employee who was accused of
defrauding the Tribe.178 The employee sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in federal court, claiming the tribal court did not have jurisdiction.179
In upholding tribal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit rejected the employee’s
claim that Hicks eliminated “the right-to-exclude framework as an
independent source or regulatory power over non-member conduct on tribal
land . . . .”180 The court also rejected the argument that tribal jurisdiction is
“limited to conduct that directly interferes with a tribe’s inherent power to
exclude and manage its own lands.”181 Finally the court clarified the
meaning of Water Wheel, stating:
Water Wheel and our subsequent cases . . . do not exclude
Montana as a source of tribal regulatory authority over
nonmember conduct on tribal land. Rather, our caselaw states
that an Indian tribe has power to regulate nonmember conduct on
tribal land incident to its sovereign power to exclude
nonmembers from tribal land, regardless of whether either of the
Montana exceptions is satisfied . . . . [A] tribe's power to
regulate nonmember conduct on tribal land flows from its
State of Arizona, and Arizona has vitally important competing interests in the
finality of its state-court judgments and its ability to enforce them. Further,
Arizona’s constitution mandates “the establishment and maintenance of a
general and uniform public school system,” a requirement of the Arizona
Enabling Act. It cannot be questioned that Arizona has a compelling interest in
complying with its statutory and state constitutional mandate.
Id. at 917 (internal citations omitted).
175. See id. at 910–14.
176. Id. at 916–18.
177. 922 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2019).
178. Id. at 894.
179. Id. at 895.
180. Id. at 900.
181. Id. at 901.
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inherent power to exclude and is circumscribed only to the
limited extent that the circumstances in Hicks—significant state
interests—are present.182
D. Conclusion to Part II
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit position, as clarified in Knighton v.
Cedarville Rancheria, is the more doctrinally sound approach among the
circuits. Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks should be interpreted as creating a
two-step analysis before tribal jurisdiction over non-members on Indianowned land could be said to have been divested. First, a court should
determine if the tribe has lost the right to exclude. If the answer is yes, the
court should determine if the tribe can exercise jurisdiction under one of the
two Montana exceptions.
Conceptualizing Hicks in this manner makes the most sense out of
Justice Scalia’s invocation of the state interest. Although considering the
state interests either as a divestment of the tribes’ right to exclude or as part
of the Montana analysis may lead to the same result, there is no doctrinal
basis to construe Scalia’s opinion as integrating a state interest into the
Montana analysis. The implicit divestiture doctrine was never about tribes
losing inherent sovereignty because of a state interest. The state interest
should only be taken into consideration when determining whether a tribe
has lost its inherent right to exclude.
There is hardly any law on what kind of state interest is sufficient or
important enough to overcome a tribe’s right to exclude. Whether the
important state interest has to be related to law enforcement is debatable.
For instance, Justice O’Connor argued that the Court’s opinion in Hicks
would “give nonmembers freedom to act with impunity on tribal land based
solely on their status as state law enforcement officials,”183 Justice Scalia
responded that the state officers cannot be regulated only in the
performance of their law enforcement duties.184 He then added, “Action
unrelated to that is potentially subject to tribal control depending on the
outcome of the Montana analysis.”185 Although a state interest does not
182. Id. at 903–04. The Ninth Circuit also added that a “tribe also has sovereign authority
to regulate nonmember conduct on tribal lands independent of its authority to exclude if that
conduct intrudes on a tribe’s inherent sovereign power to preserve self-government or
control internal relations.” Id. at 904.
183. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 401 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 373 (“We do not say state officers cannot be regulated; we say they cannot be
regulated in the performance of their law enforcement duties.”).
185. Id.
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have to be tied to law enforcement, as it was in Hicks, the state interest
should somehow be connected to state officials needing to be on Indianowned land and having the legal right to be on such lands.
III. The Treaty Right to Exclude Beyond Montana and Hicks
A. Is the Treaty Right to Exclude Different from the Sovereign Right to
Exclude?
Although tribes are surprisingly successful in getting the Supreme Court
to uphold their treaty rights, the same cannot be said for cases relying on
inherent tribal sovereignty to control the conduct of non-tribal members.186
The question, therefore, is whether tribes with a treaty right to exclude may
be better off focusing on their treaty rights rather than on an “inherent”
sovereign power to exclude. One of the more forceful statements for
treating both treaty and non-treaty reservations alike was made by Professor
Royster when she noted that all tribes with reservations have the same right
to water and other natural resources whether these reservations were
established by treaties, statutes, or executive orders.187 Therefore, while
particular treaties may clarify rights implicit in the establishment of the
reservation, she argues that whether these rights “arise from an actual treaty
or treaty-equivalent of a statute or executive order should make no
differences.”188
The difference between an inherent sovereign power and a treaty right to
exclude, if there is any, may become important when a court has to
determine whether the right to exclude has been lost. Under this Article’s
interpretation of Hicks, without a treaty, a court would have to decide
whether there are state interests that are important enough that the tribe
loses the right to exclude. If the right to exclude is based on a treaty,
however, the question should be whether there are clear indications of
congressional intent to abrogate the treaty right to exclude.189

186. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 Years of Federal Indian
Law: Looking for Equilibrium or Supremacy?, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277, 287–89 (2018).
187. See Royster, supra note 20, at 921.
188. Id.
189. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739–40 (1986) (“[W]here the evidence of
congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently compelling, ‘the weight of authority indicates
that such an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in
the legislative history of a statute.’ What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually
considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights
on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”) (citation omitted)
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B. The Treaty and Sovereign Right to Exclude at the Supreme Court
1. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe:190 The Right to Exclude as a
Sovereign Right
One year after Montana, the Court debated the right to exclude as an
inherent sovereign right.191 The issue in Merrion involved the Jicarilla
Apache Tribe’s power to impose an additional tax on a non-Indian
corporation, Merrion, that leased lands from the Tribe for the purpose of
energy development.192 Merrion argued that, because its lease with the
Tribe did not provide for the imposition of new taxes, the tribal tax was
precluded.193 The Court upheld the new tribal tax.194 The difference
between the majority opinion, penned by Justice Marshall, and the dissent,
by Justice Stevens, centered on the nature of the power to exclude and
whether the tribal power to tax derived solely from the power to exclude.195
Justice Marshall took the position that the tribal power to tax could be
derived from either inherent tribal sovereignty or the right to exclude,
which includes other lesser rights such as regulating the terms under which
anyone not excluded can remain on tribal lands.196 Justice Stevens argued
that the power to tax non-members derived solely from the power to
exclude; since the lease did not provide for additional taxes, Merrion could
not be excluded for refusing to pay such taxes.197 Regarding the dissent’s
argument, Justice Marshall stated:
[T]he dissent confuse[s] the Tribe's role as commercial partner
with its role as sovereign . . . Confusing these two… denigrates
Indian sovereignty. Indeed, the dissent apparently views the
tribal power to exclude, as well as the derivative authority to tax,
as merely the power possessed by any individual landowner or
any social group to attach conditions, including a “tax” or fee, to
(quoting FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 223 (Rennard Strickland et
al. eds., 1982)).
190. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
191. Id. at 145–47.
192. Id. at 133.
193. Id. at 136–37.
194. Id. at 149 (“The Tribe has the inherent power to impose the severance tax on
petitioners, whether this power derives from the Tribe's power of self-government or from
its power to exclude.”).
195. Id. at 140–41, 144; id. at 182–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 140–41, 144.
197. Id. at 182–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the entry by a stranger onto private land or into the social group,
and not as a sovereign power.198
As noted by Justice Marshall, in the language just quoted, the difference
between the majority and the dissent centered on whether the tribal right to
exclude was an inherent “sovereign” right or a property owner’s right. The
tribal right in Merrion was, however, a non-treaty right to exclude since the
Jicarilla Apache reservation had not been created pursuant to a treaty. In the
next examined case, the tribe relied on a treaty right to exclude.
2. South Dakota v. Bourland:199 The Right to Exclude as a Treaty Right
The issue in Bourland was whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
could regulate non-member hunting and fishing on land that was still within
the Tribe’s reservation but had been taken from the Tribe pursuant to a
federal flood control project.200 The Tribe acknowledged that even if it no
longer had a complete right to exclude, its original treaty rights still allowed
the tribe to regulate non-members fishing on these lands.201 The Court, in
an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, acknowledged that the Tribe’s
treaty right to exclude non-members from the reservation was implicit in its
rights of “absolute and undisturbed use and occupation” of such lands.202
Furthermore, the Court noted that the greater power to exclude comprised
“the lesser included, incidental power to regulate non-Indian use of, the
lands later taken for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project.”203 However, the
Court concluded that this right was implicitly abrogated when the United
States took the lands pursuant to the Flood Control Act and the Cheyenne
River Act, while giving regulatory power to the Secretary of the Army, and
opening such lands for the use of the general public.204
The Court also insisted that its decision was not in contravention of
United States v. Dion.205 There, the Court held that a treaty right can only
be abrogated if there is “clear evidence that Congress actually considered
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty
198. Id. at 145–46.
199. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
200. Id. at 681–82.
201. Id. at 691.
202. Id. at 687–88 (quoting Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crows, supra note 10, art. 2).
203. Id. at 688.
204. Id. at 689–90; see also Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 655, § 4, 58 Stat. 887, 889–
90 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 460d); Cheyenne River Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83776, § 2, 68 Stat. 1191, 1191.
205. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 693–94.
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rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty.”206 However, the Bourland Court could not explain section 10 of the
Cheyenne River Act and section 4 of the Flood Control Act except as
“indications that Congress sought to divest the Tribe of its right to ‘absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation’ of the taken area.”207 The Bourland
dissent objected strongly to that conclusion, stating that the majority
points not even to a scrap of evidence that Congress actually
considered the possibility that by taking the land in question it
would deprive the Tribe of its authority to regulate non-Indian
hunting and fishing on that land. Instead, it finds Congress’
intent implicit in the fact that Congress deprived the Tribe of its
right to exclusive use of the land . . . .208
The Bourland dissent remarked that, although the Court acknowledged the
application of cases like Dion to this case, “the majority adopt[ed] precisely
the sort of reasoning-by-implication that those cases reject.”209
In short, Merrion involved the tribal right to tax non-members pursuant
to a right to exclude over lands still owned by the tribe. Bourland, on the
other hand, dealt with the tribal right to regulate hunting and fishing by
non-members over land no longer owned by the tribe but still within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation.
C. The Treaty Right to Exclude Beyond Jurisdiction over Non-Members:
Applying Federal Laws of General Applicability to Indian Tribes
Besides its relevance in determining tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, the distinction between inherent sovereign rights and treaty rights
plays a role in the ongoing circuit debate about extending federal laws of
general applicability to Indian tribes. These are general federal laws that do
not mention Indian tribes in either the text or the legislative history.210
There are currently three official approaches employed by the circuit courts
in deciding whether to apply a general federal law to Indian tribes. Under
the prevailing approach, first formulated by the Ninth Circuit in Donovan v.
206. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740 (1986).
207. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 693 (quoting Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Crows, supra
note 10, art. 2).
208. Id. at 700 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
209. Id.
210. See Alex T. Skibine, Practical Reasoning and the Application of General Federal
Regulatory Laws to Indian Nations, 22 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123, 126
(2016).
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Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm,211 there is a presumption that federal laws that
are generally applicable to everyone are also applicable to Indian tribes.212
The tribes can, however, rebut this presumption by showing that the general
federal law would interfere with “purely intramural” aspects of tribal
sovereignty.213
Under the D.C. Circuit’s approach, as formulated in San Manuel Indian
Bingo & Casino v. NLRB,214 the focus is on whether the general federal law
would interfere with traditional powers of tribal self-government.215 Lastly,
the Tenth Circuit’s approach assumes that any federal law applied to tribes
would interfere with tribal self-government and, therefore, requires clear
indications of congressional intent to apply the law to the tribes.216
All three approaches acknowledge that general federal laws should not
be applied to Indian tribes if they interfere with some aspects of tribal selfgovernment. They differ on which aspect of tribal self-government has to
be interfered with. Every approach also agrees that a general federal law
should not be applied if it interferes with a specific treaty right unless there
is clear evidence that Congress considered the matter and decided to
abrogate the treaty right.217 This indicates that, in this area of the law, tribes
with a treaty right to exclude may be better off than those with just a
sovereign right to exclude. Finding clear evidence of congressional intent to
abrogate a treaty can, however, be a subjective inquiry. The Supreme Court,
in both Montana and Bourland, for instance, found clear indications of
congressional intent to eliminate the treaty right to exclude as to non-Indian
owned land when Congress had either transferred the land to non-Indian

211. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
212. Id. at 1115–17 (relying on FPC v. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99 (1960)).
213. Id. at 1116.
214. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
215. Id. at 1313.
216. See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The
correct presumption is that silence does not work a divestiture of tribal power.”). More
recently, a fourth approach was suggested by the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle Casino &
Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015). Although the panel acknowledged that it was
bound by a previous panel’s decision to follow the Coeur d’Alene framework, it severely
criticized that approach and argued that a much better approach would be to adopt what
could be termed a “Montana framework” in determining whether application of federal
regulatory laws to a reservation-based tribally owned enterprise would infringe on tribal
sovereignty. Id. at 662. The Soaring Eagle court took the position that the question to be
answered in such cases was “whether a tribe has the inherent sovereign authority necessary
to prevent application of a federal statute to tribal activity.” Id. at 666.
217. See Skibine, supra note 210, at 130.
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ownership or provided a mechanism for non-Indians to acquire land within
Indian reservations.218
When it comes to invoking a treaty right to prevent the application of a
federal law of general applicability, the debate centers on what kind of
treaty right qualifies. Is a treaty reserving the reservation “for the exclusive
use” of the tribe and its members specific enough to qualify under the
approaches described above? In United States v. Farris, for instance,
the Ninth Circuit stated that the treaty exception applied “only to subjects
specifically covered in treaties, such as hunting rights . . . . To bring the
special rule into play here, general treaty language such as that devoting
land to a tribe's ‘exclusive use’ is not sufficient (although such language
does suffice to oust state jurisdiction) . . . .”219
The Ninth Circuit continues to follow this position. For instance,
in Department of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission, the issue was the application of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) to a tribally owned enterprise.220 The treaty created the
reservation for the exclusive use of the tribe and stated: “[N]or shall any
white person be permitted to reside upon the same without the concurrent
permission of the agent and superintendent.”221 The Occupational Safety
and Health Commission concluded that the treaty “‘evidence[d] [] an intent
of the parties to exclude the white man from the reservation lands for any
and all purposes except as therein enumerated.’”222 Therefore, according to
the Commission, the application of OSHA to the Tribe would infringe on
the Tribe's right to exclusive use.223
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed because it did not find a great
enough conflict between the Tribe’s right to exclude and the entry
necessary to enforce OSHA to the Warm Springs mill. Instead it concluded
that “[t]he conflict must be more direct to bar the enforcement of statutes of
general applicability.”224
The Seventh Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit. In Smart v.
State Farm Insurance Co., where the issue revolved around application of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to a tribal
218. See discussion supra notes 18–23 & 126–40.
219. 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
220. 935 F.2d 182, 183 (9th Cir. 1991).
221. Id. at 184 (quoting Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, art. 1, June 25, 1855,
12 Stat. 963).
222. Id. at 184–85.
223. Id. at 185.
224. Id. at 186–87.
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healthcare center. The Seventh Circuit stated “[s]imply because a treaty
exists does not by necessity compel a conclusion that a federal statute of
general applicability is not binding on an Indian Tribe . . . . The critical
issue is whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is
secured by the treaty.”225 The court concluded that the treaty in question did
not delineate specific rights.226 The treaty just conveyed land to be “within
the exclusive sovereignty of the Tribe.”227
The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, adopted a different position on the
treaty exception. In Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Industries, the
Tenth Circuit held that OSHA was not applicable to the Tribe because the
treaty of 1868 with the Navajo Nation provided that only expressly
authorized officials could enter the Navajo reservation.228 Since applying
OSHA would allow federal employees to enter the reservation at any time
to enforce the statute, the court stated:
The Navajo Treaty recognizes the Indian sovereignty of the
Navajos and their right of self-government . . . . [A]pplication of
OSHA to NFPI [Navajo Forest Products, Inc.] would constitute
abrogation of Article II of the Navajo Treaty relating to the
exclusion of non-Indians not authorized to enter upon the Navajo
Reservation. Furthermore, it would dilute the principles of tribal
sovereignty and self-government recognized in the treaty.229
The Tenth Circuit applied Navajo Forest Products in EEOC v. Cherokee
Nation,230 where the court considered an application of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to the Cherokee Nation.231
Remarking that in Navajo Forest Products the court found that application
225. 868 F.2d 929, 934–35 (7th Cir. 1989)
226. Id. at 935 (“The treaties to which the Chippewa Tribe are signatory do not delineate
specific rights.”).
227. Id.
228. 692 F.2d 709, 712 (10th Cir. 1982). Article II of the treaty states,
[T]he United States agrees that no persons except those herein so authorized to
do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents and employees of the
Government, or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian
reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the
President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the
territory described in this article.
Treaty with the Navaho, art. 2, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
229. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d at 712.
230. 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).
231. Id. at 937–38.
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of OSHA would dilute the principles of tribal sovereignty and selfgovernment recognized in the treaty, the Cherokee Nation court concluded
that “[t]he treaty's language clearly and unequivocally recognizes tribal
self-government.”232 As a result, the ADEA did not apply “because its
enforcement would directly interfere with the Cherokee Nation's treatyprotected right of self-government.”233
The difference of opinion between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
concerning how specific a treaty right must be before it can prevent the
application of a general federal law came to the fore more recently in
Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB.234 This case involved application
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to a tribal casino.235 After
acknowledging a split between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits on one side,
and the Tenth on the other, the Sixth Circuit recognized that “the question is
a close one.”236 Nonetheless, it concluded that a treaty right to exclude was
insufficient to bar application of federal regulatory statutes of general
applicability, at least in the absence of a “direct conflict between a specific
right or exclusion and the entry necessary for effectuating the statutory
scheme.”237
Judge White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, took a different
view. Judge White began by acknowledging that, under circuit precedent,
the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty could not prevent the application of general
federal law.238 However, the Tribe’s treaty right was another matter.239
232. Id. at 938.
233. Id.
234. 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015).
235. Id. at 651.
236. Id. at 661.
237. Id. (“Although, given the protective language employed by the Supreme Court when
assessing tribal treaty rights, the question is a close one, ultimately we conclude that a
general right of exclusion, with no additional specificity, is insufficient to bar application of
federal regulatory statutes of general applicability. Unless there is a direct conflict between a
specific right of exclusion and the entry necessary for effectuating the statutory scheme, we
decline to prohibit application of generally applicable federal regulatory authority to tribes
on the existence of such a treaty right alone.”).
238. Id. at 675 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. As Judge White put it,
It well may be that when a tribe's inherent sovereignty rights are broadly
interpreted, its treaty-based exclusionary right (general or specific) has little
work to do. But out of necessity, the treaty-based right assumes a paramount
role when a tribe's inherent sovereignty has been judicially narrowed, and the
treaty should not be narrowly interpreted.
Id. at 677.
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Disagreeing with the majority that the treaty right to exclude was not
specific enough, Judge White noted that, after ceding a large amount of
land to the federal government for the right to the exclusive use and
occupancy of the remaining land, the Indian signatories to the treaty
would not have understood their right to the “exclusive use,
ownership, and occupancy” of their remaining land to be . . .
subject to regulation regarding the conditions the Tribe might
impose on those it permitted to enter. On the contrary, the Tribe
would reasonably have understood this provision to mean that
the federal government could not dictate, in any way, what the
Tribe did on the land it retained.240
Judge White concluded by stating that “[a]bsent Congress's express
direction to the contrary, the Tribe's treaty-based exclusionary right is
sufficient to preclude application of the NLRA to the Tribe's on-reservation
Casino.”241
Conclusion
A treaty right to exclude is valuable to the tribes because for this right to
be abrogated, a party must show clear evidence of congressional intent to
that effect. The Supreme Court has, however, found such clear evidence
when Congress has allowed Indian land to be transferred to non-members.
In addition, most courts generally require treaty rights to have a certain
level of specificity before acknowledging that they may give more rights
than what tribes retained under their inherent sovereign powers. Finally,
while tribes have been successful in defending their treaty rights before the
Supreme Court, just about all of the Indian treaty cases involved offreservation hunting, fishing, or gathering rights.242 Although one of the later
cases involved a treaty right to avoid state fuel taxes on tribal trucks using
state highways to reach the reservation, that case also involved offreservation activities. Moreover, none of the cases involved using a treaty
right to control the activities or non-tribal members as would be the case
when invoking the treaty right to exclude.243
240. Id. at 676.
241. Id. at 676–77.
242. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 433
U.S. 658 (1979); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999);
Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).
243. Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 193 S. Ct. 1000 (2019).
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hicks is not a model of clarity. Rather, it lends
itself to different interpretations. While each of the three interpretations can
find support in the language used in Hicks, the most doctrinally sound
interpretation among the circuits is that adopted by the Ninth Circuit.244
Under that version, before the Montana analysis can be applied to
potentially divest Indian tribes of some jurisdiction over Indian-owned
reservation lands, the tribal jurisdiction opponents must show a state
interest important enough to neutralize the tribal right to exclude.

244. See supra Section II.D.
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